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NOTE AND COMMENT
where it has been plainly discredited, even in the field where it
has had its origin." Especially is this true in this case where
the prisoner has adequate tort remedies.
Therefore, it is the conclusion of the writer that the hold-
ing in the principal case is the correct view. The reason for
the Common Law doctrine no longer exists inasmuch as plain-
tiff has a remedy against the offending officer where he can
prove actual harm. Accordingly, the doctrine of trespass ab
initio should be discarded.
-Ted James.
1943
"PRossER ON TORTS p. 157. Supra, note 8.
ORAL CONTRACTS TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY
AT DEATH
In Gravelin v. Porier' the plaintiff sued the administrator
upon an oral agreement of deceased to leave the plaintiff a
"child's share in the estate." The estate was composed of both
real and personal property. The Supreme Court held that such
an oral agreement was within the Montana statute of frauds'
both as an "agreement for the sale of real property" and an
"agreement for the sale of goods." In Rowe v. Eggum' an oral
agreement not to change an existing will was also held to be
within the statute of frauds.
In these cases Montana is in accord with the prevailing
rule.' However, in other states, distinctions are sometimes made
so that certain types of such oral agreements are withdrawn
from the statute of frauds." For example, a contract to die in-
testate has been held not to be within the statute.' But tho
there are no direct decisions on these distinctions, the language
'(1926) 77 Mont. 260, 250 P. 823.
2R. C. M. 1935, §10, 613.
'(1938) 107 Mont. 378, 81 P. (2d) 189.
'Holz v. Stephen (1936) 362 Ill. 527, 200 N. E. 601,106, A. L. R. 737; Nelson
v. Schoonover (1913) 89 Kan. 388, 131 P. 147; Hamilton v. Thirston
(1901) 93 Md. 213, 48 Atl. 709; Alexander v. Lewes (1918) 194 Wash.
32, 175 P. 572; Thompson v. Weimar (1939) 1 Wash. (2d) 145, 95 p.
(2d) 772. ScHouLEa, WrLLs (6th ed. 1923) §696, p. 795. Frauds, Stat-
ute of, 24 C.J. §170.
8Schnebly, Contract8 to Make Te8tarnentary Dispositions, 24 Mich. L.
Rev. 749 (1926).
'Stahl v. Stevenson (1918) 102 Kan. 447, 171 P. 1164; Quinn v. Quinn
(1894) 5 S.D. 328, 58 N.W. 808, 49 Am. L. R. 875.
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of the rest of the Montana cases! supports the conclusion that all
types of oral contracts to dispose of property at death are with-
in the Montana statute of frauds.
Since such contracts come within the statute, the promisee
is barred from an action at law.' However, in many cases the
promisee has given valuable consideration in reliance on the oral
promise. In order to prevent the statute of frauds from becom-
ing an instrument of fraud in such cases, equity courts have
adopted the equitable doctrine that "part performance" will in
some circumstances take the case out of the statute. This doc-
trine is based on the general interpretation that the statute of
frauds does not affect the legality of the contract but is a rule
of evidence as to the method of proof. Thus in equity "part
performance" in some cases is held to be an adequate substitute
for the written evidence which the statute requires in law.'
The Montana Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of
part performance in several fields,"° including contracts to dis-
pose of property at death.11 Section 10,611 of R. C. M. 1935 spe-
cifically provides that the doctrine may apply to transfers of
real property required to be in writing. However, the Court in
the cases under consideration has not found it necessary to men-
tion this section, but has relied on the generally accepted rule
'Burns v. Smith (1898) 21 Mont. 251, 53 P. 742; Lincoln v. Huffine
(1916) 52 Mont. 585, 160 P. 820; Wilburn v. Wagner (1921) 59 Mont.
386, 196 P. 978; Sanger v. Huguenel (1922) 65 Mont. 236, 211 P. 341;
Wonderlich v. Holt (1929) 86 Mont. 260, 283 P. 423; Langston v.
Currie (1933) 95 Mont. 57, 26 P. (2d) 160; Erwin v. Mark (1937)
105 Mont. 361, 73 P. (2d) 537.
"Thompson v. Weimar (1939) 1 Wash. (2d) 145, 95 P. 2d 772. 2 PAGE,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1919) §1372, p. 2362.
'Gravelin v. Porier, supra note 1; O'Hara v. Lynch (1915) 172 Cal.
525, 157 P. 608. POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d
ed. 1926) §96, p. 232.
1°McIntyre v. Dawes (1924) 71 M. 367, 229 P. 846; Eccles v. Kendrick
(1927) 80 M. 120, 259 P. 609.
"It is interesting to note that California with the Identical statute of
frauds decided that contracts to convey property at death did not fall
within the statute. Monsen v. Monsen (1916) 174 Cal. 97, 162 P. 90.
Owens v: McNally 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710 cites Itself as the first Cal-
ifornia case on the subject and was decided in 1896. R. C. M. 1935,
§7519 is identical to California Civil Code §1624 and was first enacted
in 1871. R. C. M. 1935, §10,613 is identical to California Code of Civil
Procedure §1973 and was first enacted in 1895. Thus, the Montana
Supreme Court was free to follow Its own interpretation. However,
in 1905 and 1907, California amended her statute of frauds to specific-
ally provide that an "agreement to devise or bequeath" must be in
writing. Then In Trout v. Olgivie (1919) 41 Cal. App. 867, 182 P.
333 the California Court decided that now even part performance
would not remove such cases from the statute.
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which it codifies.' As to personalty, the Supreme Court said in
Gravelin v. Porier at page 830 of 250 Pacific" that the
"... equitable doctrine of part performance does not apply
to all such contracts, but courts of equity decree specific
performance of contracts, not upon any distinction between
realty and personalty, but because damages at law may not
in the particular case afford a complete remedy."
This suggests, that although the same test of inadequacy of
damages is applied to both realty and personalty, damages are
more likely to be inadequate in contracts involving realty be-
cause of the peculiar nature of that type of property.
The acts necessary to constitute part performance are the
same generally for this type of contract as for other contracts."
These two tests are generally laid down, both of which must be
met:' First, the acts must be such that the promisee cannot be
restored to his original condition, even by compensation in mon-
ey. Second, the acts must be referable exclusively to the oral
contract. Montana has adopted the first test as shown by the
quotation from Gravelin v. Porier above. Montana has adopted
a liberal interpretation of this test. Erwin v. Marks" involved
an oral contract to bequeath $4000.00. It was held that person-
al services such as writing letters and confidential advice,
"which could not be purchased or had on an ordinary employ-
ment basis" were sufficient to constitute part performance. In
fact, the Supreme Court went further and said as dictum that
specific performance might be had "regardless of the character
of the service rendered," if the remedy at law were inadequate.
Thus, personal services would be sufficient part performance
even tho compensable in damages if the exact amount of such
damages could not be proved in law. However, it may well be
doubted if this dictum will be followed in view of the generally
established rule to the contrary."
"California has interpreted a similar statute, California Civil Code§1741, to mean that the doctrine of part performance should be con-
fined to contracts relating to the sale of land. Trout v. Olgivie, supra
note 11. On the other hand, Idaho has interpreted an identical stat-
ute, Idaho Code of Civil Procedure §7975, to mean that part perform-
ance would apply to both real and personal property. Bedal v. John-
son (1923) 37 Idaho 359, 218 P. 641.
"77 M. at page 270. Supra note 1.
"Coleman WmLs-CoNTRAcTs ro DmrsE, 10 TuxAs L. REv. 358 (1932);
15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 466.
"2 PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1919) §1373, p. 2364.
"(1937) 105 M. 361, 73 P. (2d) 537.
l'Morrisson v. Land (1915) 169 Cal. 580, 147 P. 259; Monsen v. Monsen(1916) 174 Cal. 97, 162 P. 90; Ballou v. First National Bank of Col-
orado (1935) 98 Colo. 101,53 P. (2d) 592.
3
Williams: Oral Contracts to Dispose of Property at Death
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1945
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court has also adopted the second test and
said that:
".. . the acts of the claimant (should be) referable alone
to the contract. "'
Some courts hold that there can be no act of part perform-
ance for the sale of realty in which possession is not taken under
the contract." Texas even goes so far as to require payment of
the consideration, possession by the vendee, and the making of
valuable improvements.' In Montana possession is not the sine
qua non of part performance. In Gravelin v. Poriern the sur-
render of a child by the mother to the promisor for adoption
was held to be full performance and to remove the case from
the statute of frauds. In Rowe v. Eggum" the promisee was in
possession, but possession was taken under a separate lease. The
personal service of the promisee in caring for and nursing the
promisor was held to be sufficient part performance even tho
realty was involved.
As for oral contracts to bequeath personalty, for example
money, possession is clearly not essential for part performance."
In McIntyre v. Dawes!' the Supreme Court said at page 849
of 229 Pacific that an oral contract ". . . unless removed from
the statute by an exception was not only invalid and unenforce-
able, but evidence of its contents may not be received."' There-
fore, acts which meet the requirements of part performance
must first be shown to prove the existence of such a contract;
and only after such proof will parol evidence be admitted to
show the contract itself and its terms.&
Even after part performance has been shown so as to justify
the admission of oral evidence, the plaintiff still has many dif-
ficulties to hurdle before he can sustain his burden of proof of
such contracts. First, he is met with R. C. M. 1935 section
10,535, subdivision 3 which provides that a party may not be a
18Sanger v. Huguenel (1922) 65 M. 236, 211 P. 341. The case cites Bau-
man v. Kusian (1913) 164 Cal. 582, 129 P. 986, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 756.
Also: McIntyre v. Dawes, note 10 supra.
"Burns v. McCormick (1922) 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273; Farin v.
Matthews (1912) 62 Or. 517, 124 P. 675, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184.
2Ilooks v. Bridgewater (1921) 111 Tex. 122, 229 S. W. 114, 15 A. L. R.
216.
"Note 1 supra.
"Note 3 supra.
"Erwin v. Marks, note 16 supra.
"'Supra note 10.
"Accord: Dreidlein v. Manger (1923) 69 M. 155, 220 P. 1107.
"POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d. ed. 1926) §107,
p. 257.
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witness in a claim against an estate as to direct transactions or
oral communications between himself and deceased, unless it ap-
pears in the court's discretion that without his testimony injus-
tice will be done. Thus, the plaintiff, or other parties claiming
under the oral contract, will be prima facie incompetent wit-
nesses. The trial court will not be justified in admitting such
testimony at its discretion until sufficient other evidence is of-
fered to make it reasonably appear that otherwise injustice will
be done." However, the court may then at its discretion admit
such testimony if it finds that otherwise the plaintiff will be un-
able to make out a prima facie case, and may refuse such testi-
mony if plaintiff has already made out a prima facie case."
Even after they are admitted, such "Declarations against in-
terest are said to be the weakest and least satisfactory of any
evidence in persuasive value."
Further, plaintiff will find that such oral contracts are
"generally not favored,' .... are regarded with suspicion,'
"are scrutinized with peculiar care,' ' and. that the "courts have
grown conservative as to the nature of evidence required to es-
tablish them."' ' So Montana requires that such contracts ". . . be
supported by clear, strong, and convincing evidence.'' But
this requirement is said to apply to the quality of the evidence
and not the quantity. Thus, a preponderance of the evidence is
held sufficient to sustain the allegations of the complaint.'
If such an oral contract is established by the preponder-
ance of the evidence, plaintiff should be entitled to some rem-
edy. The most common remedy is relief ". . . in the nature of
specific performande." Clearly in a contract to make a will,
strict specific performance is impossible since the testator is
dead. However, the same result is had by fastening a trust on
the property in the hands of the heirs or personal representa-
tives.' But before such relief is given these oral contracts must
'"Marcellus v. Wright (1923) 65 M. 580, 212 P. 299; Wunderlich v.
Holt (1929) 86 M. 260, 283 P. 423; Langston v. Curie (1933) 95 M.
57, 26 P. (2d.) 537.
"Roy v. King's Estate (1919) 55 M. 567, 179 P. 821; Rowe v. Eggum,
supra note 3.
"Langston v. Curie, supra note 27. Also Sanger v. Huguenel, (1922)
65 M. 236, 211 P. 349; Escallier v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1912) 46
M. 238, 127 P. 458, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 468.
'Sanger v. Huguenel, supra note 29.
"Alexander v. Lewes (1918) 104 Wash. 32, 175 P. 572.
'Bauman v. Kusian, supra note 18.
Davis v. Manson (1918) 102 Atl. 714, 40 R. I. 567.
'Sanger v. Huguenel, supra note 29; Langston v. Curie, supra note 27;
Rowe v. Eggum, supra note 3.
uin re Wray's Estate (1933) 93 M. 525, 19 P. (2d) 1051.
"Sanger v. Huguenel, supra note 29; Rowe v. Eggum, supra note 3.
5
Williams: Oral Contracts to Dispose of Property at Death
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1945
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
meet the same requirements as other contracts before specific
performance is granted.' Such contracts ". . . must be based
on a valuable consideration; their terms must be reasonably cer-
tain as to their stipulations, their purposes, their parties, and
the circumstances under which they were made. '" Such con-
tracts must also ". . . be free from all ambiguity, " and " ...
must be fair and equitable." Nor will such a contract be spe-
cifically enforced when rights of innocent third parties inter-
vene. '"
As has already been pointed out, since such oral contracts
are within the statute of frauds, no action at law lies for breach
of such contract." However, in case plaintiff is unable to prove
an oral contract so as to meet the requirements necessary for
specific performance, he may still sue in quantum meruit for
the value of services rendered. In such a suit no specific con-
tract need be shown. In fact, it is error to permit evidence of
the terms of such an oral contract, unless it is removed from the
statute of frauds." It has also been held that a prior suit in
quantum meruit if dismissed, is not a bar to a subsequent suit
for specific performance.""
Under some circumstances, plaintiff may be able to impose
a constructive trust upon the property involved with the prom-
isor or his heirs or representatives as trustee. This remedy is
available only in the case of an intended testamentary disposi-
tion, which is thwarted by the promise of one in a confidential
relation to the intending testator. The promisor then takes sub-
ject to performance; and a breach by him, whether fraudulent
in intent or not, creates a constructive trust in favor of the or-
iginal intended beneficiary."
Carter Williams.
758 C. J. Spectic Performanoe §309.
'Sanger v. Huguenel, aupra note 29. Accord: Rowe v. Eggum, supra
note 3.
'Wllburn v. Wagner (1921) 59 M. 386, 196 P. 978.
"Langston v. Curie, aupra note 27.
0Owens v. McNally (1896) 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710; Gall v. Gall (1893)
138 N. Y. 675, 34 N. E. 515.
"Supra note 8. Accord: Hull v. Thomas (1910) 82 Conn. 647, 74 Atl.
925; Hamilton v. Thirston (1901) 93 Md. 213, 48 Atl. 709.
"Dreidlen v. Manger (1923) 69 M. 155, 220 P. 1107.
"Rowe v. Eggum, oupra note 3.
"Huffine v. Lincoln (1916) 52 M. 585, 160 P. 820.
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